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This paper presents an alternative to secure exchange of encrypted information through public open
channels. Chaotic encryption introduces a security improvement by an efﬁcient masking of the message
with a chaotic signal. Message extraction by an authorized end user is done using a synchronization pro-
cedure, thus allowing a continuous change of the encrypting and decrypting keys.
And optical implementation with a 4f optical encrypting architecture is suggested. Digital simulations,
including the effects of missing data, corrupted data and noise addition are shown. These results proof the
consistency of the proposal, and demonstrate a practical way to operate with it.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In recent literature, authors proposed several methods for the
encryption of 2D information using linear optical systems [1–3].
Optical security technology is based in complex information pro-
cesses where the signals are ﬁrst hidden from human perception
(to keep them secret). Besides, images should be extremely difﬁ-
cult to be reproduced with the same properties (to avoid counter-
feiting). Optical security techniques involve tasks such as
encoding, encryption, recognition, secure identiﬁcation and/or
veriﬁcation. We paid much attention to the double random phase
encoding (DRPE) system [1]. This is a method to encode a primary
image into a white-noise-like distribution. The method uses two
random phase key codes on each of the input and Fourier planes
and it can be implemented either optically or electronically in
both the encryption and the decryption stages. In linear (ampli-
tude-based) encoding, the primary image, which is commonly as-
sumed to be real and positive, is encoded in magnitude in the
encrypted image. In nonlinear (full-phase) encoding, a phase-only
version of the primary image is encoded. With amplitude-based
encoding the ﬁrst phase mask is not needed to decode the en-
crypted image, whereas this mask has to be known with full-
phase encoding. Both possibilities have been analyzed in the pres-
ence of perturbation of the encrypted image, and the results showll rights reserved.
eda).their good properties regarding noise robustness [4,5]. In the
presence of additive noise, and using the mean-square error met-
ric, Ref. [4] shows that full-phase encoding performs better than
amplitude-based encoding.
Regarding high transfer rates, holographic data storage [6,7] of-
fers terabyte capacity. Optical multiplexing encryption systems [8–
11] were used to improve the performance of these systems. This
improvement is attributed to the suppression of cross talk between
adjacent images. While the original data is recovered with the cor-
rect random phase key, the overlapping reconstructed images from
neighboring orders remain white-noise-like images because an
incorrect random phase key has been used.
Recently, concern about the vulnerability of the encryption sys-
tems based on DRPE has arose. Several authors [12–14] have used
different attacks in order to access the encrypted information and
have been able to recover the keys (phase masks) of the system in
cases where the attacker has access to a few plaintexts and its cor-
responding cyphertexts. To overcome this system ﬂaw authors
have proposed the use of frequency spectral analysis and Fresnel
domain or Fractional Fourier Transform schemes instead of the
Fourier Transform scheme.
Summarizing, there are several attempts to overcome the cru-
cial shortcomings derived from eavesdroppers’ attacks, designing
a highly reliable security protocol.
With this in mind, now we ﬁnd in chaotic encryption an alter-
native candidate for security improvement of optical telecommu-
nication systems. Chaotic systems are dynamical systems that
defy synchronization. Two identical autonomous chaotic systems
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tories which quickly become uncorrelated, even though each maps
out the same attractor in phase space. It is thus a practical impos-
sibility to construct identical, independent, chaotic, synchronized
systems in the laboratory.
The development of synchronized chaotic systems has been
greatly motivated by the possibility of encoding information with-
in a chaotic carrier. This possibility was explored in electronic cir-
cuits whereby a small analog signal (the message) was added to a
chaotic voltage and transmitted to a receiver that is a replica of the
electronic circuit that generates the chaotic carrier. The receiver
synchronizes with the chaotic carrier itself, and a subtraction of
the synchronized signal from the transmitted signal (carrier + mes-
sage) results in the recovery of the message.
The security of data encryption using chaos methods relies
upon two important points: the unpredictability of the carrier sig-
nal, and the sensitivity exhibited by the dynamics of chaotic sys-
tems under parameter mismatch. Due to the second point, only a
system very similar to the chaotic transmitter can be used to de-
code the message in an efﬁcient way.
Summarizing, the operation principle behind chaotic encryption
relies on the efﬁcient masking of the message within a chaotic sig-
nal and the extraction of the message at the receiver’s side through
a synchronization process that allows a continuous change of the
encrypting and decrypting keys. We ﬁnd the experimental proof
for different conﬁgurations involving semiconductor laser emitters
that operate in the telecommunication wavelengths and that exhi-
bit chaotic dynamics of high complexity [15–17]. Among all possi-
ble schemes, optical feedback is one of the most extensive
conﬁgurations used to generate a high-dimensional chaotic laser
output [16].
In this contribution, we use a DRPE system in a 4f encryption
architecture, where the random masks of the DRPE are obtained
using a non-linear system in chaotic regime. The great innova-
tion is obtaining the right decrypting mask, which allows modi-
fying the encrypting mask indeﬁnitely without sending the
correct decrypting mask to the authorized user. Another advan-
tage is the transmission of both the encrypted image and the
key construction data (driving message) through public open
channels without any risk. Encryption is performed using Fourier
transforms.
Additionally, we address the results of losing information, cor-
rupting information and adding noise to the data needed to recon-
struct the decryption key. This technique enhances the overall
security and exploits in the best way the characteristics of the cha-
otic behavior of dynamical systems.
2. Chaotic phase mask generation for image encryption
Phase masks for the encryption procedure are generated from
the y state of the chaotic web map [18], Xnþ1 ¼ FðXnÞ, Xn ¼ ðxn; ynÞFig. 1. Maximum Lyapunov exponent, the coordinate corresponds to ða; kÞ ¼xnþ1 ¼ xn cosa ðyn þ k sin xnÞ sina;
ynþ1 ¼ xn sinaþ ðyn þ k sin xnÞ cosa: ð1Þ
Which is an area preserving map, moreover, it is a symplectic
one:
foFXoF ¼ X; ð2Þ
where X is the symplectic matrix. Thus there is not a transient re-
gime in the dynamics, ensuring that the values y for the phase mask
are chaotic from the beginning of the iteration. We choose the oper-
ation point in the parameter space to be a ¼ 1:366 and k ¼ 3 where
the maximum exponent is positive (Fig. 1), at this point the phase
space exhibits irregular zones and stability islands as it is typical
for symplectic dynamics.
3. Chaotic system synchronization for image decryption
Consider two chaotic systems operating with different initial
conditions; the states for this systems will be denoted by Xn and
~Xn, the former being described by (1) and the latter by
~xnþ1 ¼ ~xn cos ~a ð~yn þ ~k sin ~xnÞ sin ~aþ uðXn; ~XnÞ;
~ynþ1 ¼ ~xn sin ~aþ ð~yn þ ~k sin ~xnÞ cos ~a; ð3Þ
for the sake of simplicity let us consider the case ~a ¼ a and ~k ¼ k.
The term u is included to compensate the difference between the
systems states in order to reach synchronization between them
(see Eq. 4). Now, let suppose the state xn of the ﬁrst system is mea-
sured and sent to the second one, in such a way that ~xn ¼ xn. With
this two considerations it is a direct task to compute the error be-
tween this systems, that is the difference of the states
X0n ¼ ~Xn  Xn, whose dynamics is described by
x0nþ1  ~xnþ1  xnþ1 ¼ y0n sinaþ uðXn; ~XnÞ;
y0nþ1  ~ynþ1  ynþ1 ¼ y0n cosa; ð4Þ
since a measure of xn is available for all n, is straightforward to set
the dependence of the input function u only on this state, that is
u ¼ uðxn; ~xnÞ, moreover, let choose a speciﬁc form for u based in
feedback control theory [19]
uðxn; ~xnÞ ¼ bð~xn  xnÞ; 0 < b < 1: ð5Þ
Here is important to note that in Eq. (5) ~xn has the value ob-
tained with Eq. (3) for the n step and with ~xn1 ¼ xn1, thus it is
not equal to the value xn obtained with Eq. (1) for the same step
unless the systems are synchronized, since Eqs. (1) and (3) have
a dependency on y and ~y, respectively. With this election the error
dynamics becomes linear
X0nþ1 ¼ AX0n; ð6Þ
with A having eigenvalues at fb; cosag, both with module smaller
than unity, thus the error goes asymptotically to zero with the spent400 200 0 200 400
400
200
0
200
400
xn
y n
ð1:366;3Þ (left panel), Phase space for the operation point (right panel).
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smaller spent time. Note that by sending only the xn state, systems
Xn and ~Xn are quickly synchronized (ﬁg. 2) and therefore both
dynamical states reach the same numerical values after few itera-
tions, allowing a continuous change of the encrypting masks (see
Eq. 7). In order to synchronize both systems, system ~Xn must know
the parameters k and a and the whole time series xn (it does not
matter initial conditions), however only k and a have to be secret
while xn can be sent using a public channel. Although the encryp-
tion algorithm is public it does not make it vulnerable to brute force
attacks, for example, suppose the actual values of a and k are irra-
tional and are chosen such the system is operated in a chaotic re-
gime, small variations around these values leave the system still
operating in a chaotic regime (see Fig. 1), making impossible to
choose the correct values of the parameters by following a brute
force attack, since brute force attacks only enables rational values
of the parameters a and k.
A scheme of the whole communication system is shown in
Fig. 3. The phase masks are generated from the relation
/n
2p
¼ 2ynmod1: ð7Þ
The map 2ynmod1 has an invariant measurement constant [20]
so that phases look like having a random origin, which is a wrong
prediction since the true origin is a chaotic dynamics. This chaotic
origin ensures a high sensibility to initial conditions, i.e. slightlyFig. 2. Phase mask synchronization for b ¼ 0:5.
Fig. 3. System scheme.
Fig. 5. Suggested opticadifferent initial conditions lead to completely uncorrelated
encrypting chaotic phase masks, and thus generating a dynamical
encrypting process where the encrypting and decrypting masks
can be change continuously.
4. Optical implementation and performance simulations
Optical implementation is a key factor in the development of
this information security techniques. Two main architectures: 4f
(Fig. 4) and Joint Transform Correlator (JTC) [21,22], together with:
Spatial Light Modulators (SLMs), photorefractive crystals and holo-
graphic or digital holographic techniques [23–26], are commonly
used. With this in mind a suitable optical implementation for the
proposed security system is presented in Fig. 5. In the encrypting
step a computer generates the chaotic phase masks and addresses
two SLMs in a 4f optical architecture (SLM1 displays the original
image and the ﬁrst phase mask in plane O, SLM2 displays the
encrypting phase mask in plane K, as seen in Figs. 4 and 5). The
computer, through a CCD (in plane E, Fig. 4), stores the hologram
of the encrypted image and uses a digital holographic technique
to send the complex-value encrypted image through a public chan-
nel together with the driving message. In the decrypting step, an-
other computer, by means of the driving message, generates the
decrypting chaotic phase mask and addresses two SLMs in a 4f
optical architecture (SLM3 displays the inverted complex-value en-
crypted image, SLM4 displays the decrypting phase mask in plane
K, as seen in Figs. 4 and 5). The computer, through a CCD (in plane
E, Fig. 4), stores the decrypted image.
In order to study the performance of the system a 4f architec-
ture is simulated for the image encryption and decryption with
chaotic phase masks (Fig. 4). For the encryption process the chaotic
phase mask and the amplitude image to be encrypted are placed in
plane O. In plane K the Fourier transform of the phase mask and
amplitude image is obtained by means of lens L1, and then multi-
plied by the encrypting chaotic phase mask. Finally, using lens L2
the amplitude in plane K is Fourier transformed to plane E, obtain-
ing the desired encrypted image.L1
f1 f1
L2
f2 f2
O EK
Fig. 4. 4f optical setup. In plane K lens L1 performs the Fourier Transform of objects
in plane O. In plane E lens L2 performs the Fourier Transform of objects in plane K. f1
and f2 are the focal length of lens L1 and L2, respectively.
l implementation.
Fig. 6. Gray scale image with 512  512 pixels for the simulations.
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verted in plane O, Fourier transformed into the plane K, multiplied
by the complex conjugate of the decrypting chaotic phase mask ob-
tained by means of the proposed synchronization method and Fou-
rier transformed into the plane E, where the intensity stored by the
recording media will correspond to: the correct decrypted image if
the right decrypting mask is used, or white-noise-like image if a
wrong mask is used.
In order to show the invulnerability of the proposed system an
image encrypted with it is then decrypted using: (i) a random gen-
erated phase decrypting mask, (ii) an old decrypting mask gener-
ated with the true security parameters but different initial
conditions in the encoding step, and (iii) a decrypting mask gener-
ated with security parameters very similar to the true ones. Results
are compared with the decrypted image obtained with the true
security parameters. Simulations were performed on the gray scale
image of Fig. 6 with a 512  512 pixels size.
The security parameters and initial conditions are: for the
authorized encoder k ¼ 3, a ¼ 1:366, x0 ¼ 3:6 and y0 ¼ 1:3. For
the authorized decoder k ¼ 3, a ¼ 1:366, ~x0 ¼ 2:6 and ~y0 ¼ 2:8.
For (ii) k ¼ 3, a ¼ 1:366, x0 ¼ 6:5 and y0 ¼ 4:0, and for (iii)
k ¼ 3, a ¼ 1:364, ~x0 ¼ 5:1 and ~y0 ¼ 2:4.
Figs. 7a and b show the encrypting mask and the encrypted im-
age, respectively. The decrypted images are presented in: Fig. 7c
using the true security parameters, Fig. 7d using a random gener-
ated decrypting mask (i), Fig. 7e using an old generated decrypting
mask (ii), and Fig. 7f using a decrypting mask generated with secu-
rity parameters very similar to the true ones (iii). This system can
be improved if in addition to the two security parameters, another
security parameter is added in the form of the fractional Fourier or-
der when the 4f setup is replace by the 4f optical fractional Fourier
setup [27,28].
5. Communication losses and additive noise
The idea with the optical processing is to use its parallel
information processing ability and its high processing speed (thea b
d e
Fig. 7. (a) Encrypting phase mask obtained with the proposed system, (b) encrypted imag
decrypted image using a random generated decrypting mask (i), (e) decrypted image usin
generated with security parameters very similar to the true ones (iii).speed of light), specially in the usually time-consuming encryption
step. But in a real situation this encrypted 2D information must be
transmitted using the common digital channels of communication
and so the encrypted information has to be codiﬁed for the trans-
mission and decodiﬁed for the decryption step (5). This procedure
will inevitably introduce additive noise and cause the loss and cor-
ruption of some information, thus affecting the quality of the im-
age. In particular, this technique requires the transmission of
both, the encrypted information and the driving message (xn).
Ref. [4] address the results of adding noise to the encrypted image
using an MSE metric. In this work a new metric is going to be use
to address the results of losing and corrupting information, and
adding noise in the driving message data. Thus simulations of los-
ing, corrupting and addition of noise to the driving message data
have been performed. The new metric is deﬁned in order to facili-c
f
e, (c) decrypted image using the true security parameters of the authorized user, (d)
g an old generated decrypting mask (ii), (f) decrypted image using a decrypting mask
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lost pixels percent in the driving message
N
M
SE
4.0%
Fig. 9. NMSE as a function of the data loss percent in the driving message.
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ison that can not be done with the unbounded MSE metric. The
new metric is simply the well known MSE divided by the MSE ob-
tained when the decrypted image corresponds to a completely ran-
dom white-noise-like image. This has the property that all possible
values are between 0 (perfectly decrypted image) and 1 (white-
noise-like decrypted image). NMSE stands by Normalized Mean
Square Error and is deﬁned as
NMSEðI0; IÞ ¼ 1K
XN
i;j
Iði; jÞ  I0ði; jÞj j2; ð8Þ
where I0 and I denote the input and output image intensity at the
pixel ði; jÞ, respectively. The image has a total of N  N pixels, and
K (Eq. 9) is the MSE between I0 and a white-noise-like image Iw
K ¼
XN
i;j
Iwði; jÞ  I0ði; jÞj j2: ð9Þ
In the ﬁrst case the driving message is subjected to data loss,
corresponding to changing the value of a randomly selected pixel
to a null value. Fig. 9 shows the result NMSE for the driving mes-
sage. The second case corresponds to a data corruption where a
randomly selected pixel randomly changes its value. Fig. 10
shows the NMSE for the driving message. The third case takes
into account an additive noise. This additive noise was applieda b
d e
g h
Fig. 8. Results of the image decryption with: data loss for (a) NMSE ¼ 0:1, (b) NMS
NMSE ¼ 0:8, and noise addition for (g) NMSE ¼ 0:1, (h) NMSE ¼ 0:5, (i) NMSE ¼ 0:8.to all the driving message time series and corresponds to a per-
centage of the mean absolute value of such time series. Fig. 11
shows the NMSE for the driving message. Figs. 9–11 show that
the decryption process is more sensible to additive noise than
to loss or corruption of information in the driving message. This
difference exists because additive noise always affects all the pix-
els of the image, thus each time the system is synchronized the
additive noise change the correct value and so the synchroniza-
tion process has to ‘‘start” again, problem that only occurs inc
f
i
E ¼ 0:5, (c) NMSE ¼ 0:8, data corruption for (d) NMSE ¼ 0:1, (e) NMSE ¼ 0:5, (f)
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Fig. 10. NMSE as a function of the data corruption percent in the driving message.
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comes important. Finally, if a recognizable image in the decryp-
tion process is considered the limit of the acceptable noise, loss
or corruption, a NMSE ¼ 0:8 will be the value of maximum toler-
ance as can be seen in Fig. 8.
When thinking in the practical implementation of our proposal,
we have to focus on the SLM performance. The condition for full-
range complex modulation is that the SLM must provide a 2p-
range phase modulation. In that sense, look-up table encoding
methods permits the compensation of phase-amplitude coupling
and nonlinearity in the SLM modulations.
Experimental techniques for determining the SLM-device
parameters, for maximizing the phase-mostly modulation range
and the amplitude-mostly modulation contrast, and for testing
the complex-amplitude modulation were developed in the litera-
ture, therefore for the sake of brevity we do not discuss them here
[29–31]. We have to mention also that the commercially available
devices are generally produced under proprietary conditions. Every
single SLM unit may show signiﬁcant differences in its optical
behavior from other units of even the same trademark and model.
Consequently, knowledge of the Jones matrix for these devices
helps to evaluate their performance in optical processing systems.
It is clear that the quality and effectiveness of the optical com-
ponent addressed to the SLM strongly depends on the knowledge
of the device response. In fact, the signal must be modiﬁed before
addressing it to the SLM to compensate for the distortions inter-
nally introduced by the device and hence, to eventually reproduce
the optical signal with the desired performance. It is important to
obtain good enough dynamic ranges and try to correct for the non-
linear mapping of digital gray-level (voltage) to phase modulation.
Nevertheless, once calibration operation is performed, we can
overcome these issues and work correctly with currently commer-
cially available devices.6. Conclusions
This paper introduces an alternative approach to the ﬁeld of
optical encryption. Using tools from non-linear systems operated
in chaotic regime and a synchronization process, it is possible to
generate phase masks to be used in a 4f optical encrypting-
decrypting architecture, preserving the conditions found in opti-
cally generated phase masks and achieving an increase in security
by allowing the use of public open channels and a continuous
change of encrypting and decrypting masks without risks. We prof-
it from the fact that the chaotic regime dynamics origin of the
masks leads to a high sensitivity to the initial conditions. In this
way, slight differences in these conditions produce completely
uncorrelated encrypting chaotic phase masks.
We also successfully addressed the effects of losing and cor-
rupting information, and noise addition into the data needed to
get the right decryption key. In analyzing the introduction of alter-
ations in the transmitted information, we deﬁne a new metric, the
NMSE. Clearly, with NMSE we make easier result comparisons.
Along the proposal, results show the potential, versatility and
security improvement obtained with our method. We also foresee
additional improvements using encrypting optical architectures
working in the fractional Fourier domain, thus offering extra secu-
rity parameters (fractional order). We emphasize that this new
encryption-decryption alternative is a promising one, specially
when actual message transmission through open channels is of
concern.
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